POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE POST-RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH

Patrick A. Testa Jhacova Williams

ONLINE APPENDIX

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A. Expanding on Conceptual Framework

This Appendix expands on our conceptual framework in Section II.2, which argues that political actors in the post-Reconstruction South had means to evaluate the local state of the Black "power threat" through election outcomes—namely, the placement of the Democratic candidate for president in county-level returns. This argument builds on previous evidence on candidate rankings as having informational effects independent of direct policy, incumbency, or other officeholder effects (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Granzier et al., 2023). Such evidence has focused on ranking effects among non-winners, wherein, e.g., even narrow second-place "winners" fare better relative to third-place "losers" in subsequent contests.

To further motivate this line of argument in our setting—and in turn explain why Democratic elites might have invested in anti-Black violence in such places—we explore whether narrow Democratic "losers" at the county level in presidential contests between 1880 and 1900 fared worse in subsequent *local* election results, relative to non-Democratic "winners." Insofar as they did, this would provide Democratic elites with at least one incentive to be attune to even the narrowest of Democratic losses, despite those county-level results having no direct bearing on policy or other officeholder effects in themselves. To identify such effects, we estimate a regression discontinuity (RD) design akin to our primary empirical strategy from Section III:

$$\text{Local Officeholders}_{c(s),\tau+1} = \beta \cdot \text{Democratic Loss}_{c\tau} + f(\text{Loss Margin}_{c\tau}) + \phi_\tau + \theta_s + \mathbf{X}'_{c\tau}\mathbf{\Gamma} + \varepsilon_{c\tau},$$

where $Local\ Officeholders_{c(s),\tau+1}$ captures the number of Democratic local officeholders in county c of state s as of presidential election $\tau + 1$. In our preferred specification, this count subtracts the number matched to the same county identifier as of election τ. This measure is based on the set of individuals matched to a given county and holding public office in a given year from the Political Graveyard (Kestenbaum, 2023), with the set of offices restricted to local ones (e.g., mayoral, postmaster). $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$, meanwhile, captures whether the Democratic candidate for president lost the popular vote in county c in a given election year τ. By interacting $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ with a running variable for the Democratic loss margin, $f(Loss\ Margin_{c\tau})$, we estimate treatment effects based on counties with very close election outcomes in a given election year. Further controls include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude, and the total number of local officeholders in a given county as of a given election period (i) τ and (ii) $\tau + 1$. Please refer to Appendix B for further detail on our overall RD strategy.

Appendix Table A.1 shows that even a narrow Democratic loss in a county across the 1880–1900 president elections predicts a relative decline in the number of Democratic local officeholders by the following electoral period, all else fixed. Notably, there is no significant discontinuity associated with the number of Democratic officeholders as of the contemporaneous election τ. Rather, the discontinuity emerges only as of the following election, driven by

a relative decline in the number of Democratic local officeholders serving counties where the party had narrowly lost four years prior (see Appendix Figure A.1). Of course, as we discuss in Section V, Black lynchings tend to reverse this trend over the longer term.

TABLE A.1. Local Democratic Officeholders After Presidential Losses, 1880–1900

Dependent Variable:	Democratic Local Officeholders in County as of [...]							
	Election $\tau+1$ Minus as of τ				$\tau+1$		τ	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ	-.064***	-.07**	-.059***	-.068**	-.043**	-.044*	.018	.019
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total officeholders controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	21.16	31.04	23.50	32.30	22.35	28.18	18.80	27.61
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03
Observations	1,973	2,696	2,190	2,787	2,079	2,507	1,751	2,476

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates for the number of Democratic local officeholders in a given county as of election $\tau+1$ following a given presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, 1884, ..., 1900\}$ relative to as of election τ. Local officeholder composition based on individuals linked to a given county and holding public office at a given time from Kestenbaum (2023). Set of offices restricted to local ones (e.g., mayoral, postmaster). Columns 3–8 control for the total number of local officeholders in a given county as of a given election period (i) τ and (ii) $\tau+1$. Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials for county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE A.1. Change in Local Democratic Officeholders by Democratic Loss Margin in Presidential Elections, 1880–1900



Notes: Binned estimates of the change in the number of Democratic local officeholders in a given county as of election $\tau+1$ following a given presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, 1884, ..., 1900\}$, relative to as of election τ, by the Democratic margin of loss in τ. Negative values on the x-axis indicate the Democratic candidate won a given county, while positive values indicate that they lost. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude.

B. IDENTIFICATION AND RD APPENDIX

To identify the causal effects of Democratic electoral losses on local lynching activity, we adopt a regression discontinuity (RD) design, based on the identifying assumption that counties in which Democrats barely lost are similar in all relevant ways to those in which Democrats barely won. Reiterating equation (1),

$$\text{Any Lynching}_{c(s)\tau} = \beta \cdot \text{Democratic Loss}_{c\tau} + f(\text{Loss Margin}_{c\tau}) + \phi_\tau + \theta_s + \mathbf{X}'_{c\tau}\mathbf{\Gamma} + \varepsilon_{c\tau},$$

recall that $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ captures whether the Democratic candidate for president lost the popular vote in county c in a given election year τ. By interacting $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ with a running variable for the Democratic loss margin, $f(Loss\ Margin_{c\tau})$, we estimate treatment effects based on counties with very close election outcomes in a given election year.

In this Appendix, we provide additional details on this estimating strategy. First, we describe the process of estimating this RD specification, including assumptions made therein. Second, we highlight additional evidence in support of our identifying assumptions. Finally, we report estimates from several additional heterogeneous effects exercises cited in the text.

RD Specification. Our baseline RD specification adopts the data-driven approach from Calonico et al. (2014), whose `rdrobust` package in Stata computes and automatically selects the MSE-optimal bandwidth under which local randomization is likely to be satisfied given the data. As such, this bandwidth may vary by outcome variable and other aspects of the specification, such as the running variable polynomial.

We adopt a linear running polynomial for our main analysis, while also reporting estimates of our main results using a quadratic polynomial where possible through. We furthermore adopt a triangular kernel, which places greater weight on observations close to the Democratic loss threshold, $Loss\ Margin_{c\tau} = 0$.

Verifying RD Assumptions. Our empirical strategy faces a number of challenges. Of central importance is the assumption that relevant factors besides the outcome are continuous around the Democratic loss threshold, $Loss\ Margin_{c\tau} = 0$. If they are not, then estimates may reflect discontinuities in other factors besides Democratic Party losses. To test the assumption that close elections are in fact occurring in otherwise similar places, we first examine the distribution of the running variable around the loss threshold. Insofar as electoral outcomes were potentially manipulable in the post-Reconstruction South, such selection could generate differences between treatment and control counties. For instance, if the set of local Democratic elites successfully manipulated local election returns in their favor, resulting in a narrow *win* in a given county, a lynching may not have occurred where it otherwise would have, likely attenuating the treatment effect.

Using the formal test based on McCrary (2008) and assuming a linear estimating polynomial, we fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p = 0.4$) that the density function of $Loss\ Margin_{c\tau}$ is continuous at the loss threshold.

Of course, it is worth noting that such standard manipulation tests for RD designs do not accommodate the fixed effects or controls, nor the clustering of standard errors, featured in our empirical model. Reassuringly, the balance test results in Table I also fail, using equation (1), to estimate statistically significant differences at the threshold across a large set of pre-treatment outcomes, conditional on the baseline set of fixed effects and controls. This constitutes additional, strong evidence against endogenous sorting of electoral outcomes around the loss threshold in our context. Appendix Table B.1 shows that this remains the case if we instead use a quadratic running polynomial, while Appendix Table B.2 replicates these findings using a fixed bandwidth of 15 p.p. across all outcomes. Finally, further reaffirming our identifying assumptions, our main results are minimally changed when we include all of these factors as flexible controls in our RD analysis in Table III.

FIGURE B.1. McCrary Density Test in Democratic Vote Share Margins



Notes: Figure illustrates the density test from Cattaneo et al. (2018) following McCrary (2008), based on a linear estimating polynomial, using the Democratic margin of loss in presidential elections $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$ among our full sample of counties ($p = 0.4$). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

TABLE B.1. Quadratic Running Polynomials in Table I

Dependent Variable:	Log Population Density (1)	% Black Population (2)	% Former Slaveholders (3)	% Confederate Veterans (4)	Any Civil War Battles (5)	Average Farm Size (6)	Return on Cotton Potential (7)	Return on Tobacco Potential (8)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ	.109	3.777	.513	.130	.093	96.639	.001	.000
	(0.100)	(2.51)	(0.460)	(0.530)	(0.071)	(95.1)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	30.75	28.04	35.87	27.01	21.76	31.27	25.98	29.11
Running polynomial	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	-11.77	35.34	7.80	30.41	0.18	215.92	0.05	0.06
Observations	2,627	2,457	2,964	2,380	1,985	2,644	2,314	2,528

Dependent Variable:	Percent Aged 5–17 (9)	Manufacturing Wages per Capita (10)	Manufacturing Output per Capita (11)	Agricultural Output per Capita (12)	Real Estate per Capita (13)	Personal Property per Capita (14)	State Taxes per Capita (15)	Local Taxes per Capita (16)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ	-.222	1.044	6.609	0.000	3.185	-1.60	.020	.111
	(0.290)	(0.740)	(4.21)	(2.21)	(8.41)	(3.71)	(0.055)	(0.190)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	32.09	24.20	23.76	23.92	25.69	30.43	28.23	24.20
Running polynomial	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	32.92	2.27	15.32	38.87	93.73	44.71	0.83	0.31
Observations	2,724	2,200	2,161	2,166	2,268	2,581	2,441	2,181

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for various pre-treatment county-level characteristics. See Section III.2 for more details on variables. Estimates based on quadratic running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE B.2. Using a Fixed Bandwidth in Table I

Dependent Variable:	Log Population Density (1)	% Black Population (2)	% Former Slaveholders (3)	% Confederate Veterans (4)	Any Civil War Battles (5)	Average Farm Size (6)	Return on Cotton Potential (7)	Return on Tobacco Potential (8)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ	.114	2.490	.316	.511	.060	148.44	.002	.000
	(0.120)	(2.90)	(0.610)	(0.600)	(0.071)	(123.0)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00
Running polynomial	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
Control outcome mean	-11.70	35.75	7.92	30.49	0.20	216.47	0.05	0.06
Observations	1,392	1,392	1,391	1,391	1,393	1,385	1,393	1,393

Dependent Variable:	Percent Aged 5–17 (9)	Manufacturing Wages per Capita (10)	Manufacturing Output per Capita (11)	Agricultural Output per Capita (12)	Real Estate per Capita (13)	Personal Property per Capita (14)	State Taxes per Capita (15)	Local Taxes per Capita (16)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ	.110	.721	5.061	1.215	1.193	-5.014	.007	.034
	(0.320)	(0.940)	(5.49)	(2.39)	(10.8)	(5.01)	(0.074)	(0.230)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00
Running polynomial	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
Control outcome mean	32.97	2.38	15.87	38.04	93.99	44.26	0.83	0.29
Observations	1,392	1,391	1,391	1,387	1,379	1,379	1,379	1,379

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for various pre-treatment county-level characteristics. All characteristics are measured as of 1880 except for columns 7–8, which interact indexes of theoretical cotton and tobacco potential per unit of land from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' (FAO) Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database with per pound prices as of presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$ from the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Crop Production Historical Track Records. See Section III.2 for more details on variables. Estimates based on linear running polynomials and a fixed bandwidth of 15 p.p. The split-sample p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the difference between coefficients on $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ across subsamples is zero (e.g., between columns 1 and 3). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE B.3. Using a Fixed Bandwidth in Table II

Dependent Variable:	Any Lynchings of [...] People After Election τ							
	Black				White			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.125**	.133*	.138**	.147**	.005	.011	.005	.011
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Observations	1,418	1,418	1,418	1,418	1,418	1,418	1,418	1,418

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black (columns 1–4) and White (columns 5–8) lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and a fixed bandwidth of 15 p.p. All regressions include election period fixed effects, while columns 3–4 and 7–8 also include state fixed effects and quadratic polynomials for county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE B.2. Leave-One-Out: Sensitivity to Excluding Individual Observations

(A) Distribution of RD Estimates



(B) RD Estimates and p-values



Notes: Panel (a) of this figure reports the distribution of bias-corrected local-polynomial RD point estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, conditional on each observation in the sample being dropped one by one. Panel (b) reports the relationships between these point estimates and their robust p-values. Estimates based on a linear running polynomial and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

TABLE B.4. Using a Fixed Bandwidth in Table IV

Dependent Variable:	Any Black Lynchings After Election τ											
Sample:	Democrat-Won in Previous Election $\tau-1$				Uncompetitive in Previous Election $\tau-1$				Uncompetitive + Democrat-Won in $\tau-1$			
	Yes		No		Yes		No		Yes		No	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.187**	.213**	.008	.014	.290**	.360**	.076	.062	.425***	.509***	.061	.053
	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.120)	(0.160)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.140)	(0.200)	(0.059)	(0.073)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Split-sample p-value	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00
Control outcome mean	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.14
Observations	937	937	473	473	551	551	859	859	412	412	998	998

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, conditional on whether Democrats won a given county in the previous election $\tau-1$ (columns 1–4), whether a county was electorally uncompetitive in $\tau-1$, within the median vote margin among sample Democratic electoral losses ($|Loss\ Margin_c| = 16.2$) as the cutoff (columns 5–8), and both (columns 9–12). Estimates based on linear (odd columns) or quadratic (even) running polynomials and a fixed bandwidth of 15 p.p. The split-sample p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the difference between coefficients on $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ across subsamples is zero (e.g., between columns 1 and 3). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C. Data and Sample Robustness

This Appendix describes the dataset and the construction of the sample used for our empirical analysis. Specifically, we (i) show summary statistics for our main variables, (ii) describe our choices of states and election years, (iii) provide further discussion of how our main treatment and outcome variables are coded, and (iv) show some additional robustness exercises affirming these choices.

C.1. Data and Sample

In this first section, we summarize our dataset and describe the choices of states and years used for our analysis, while providing additional details and exercises to address potential concerns about these choices.

Summary Statistics Appendix Table C.1 reports summary statistics for our core sample, restricting the set of observations to those within 50 percentage points around the Democratic loss threshold, such that summary statistics focus on relatively competitive places.

Choice of Sample States. For our analysis, we focus on the eleven former Confederate states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. These arguably best capture what would be known as the "Solid South" by the early 20th century—a regional Democratic Party stronghold in which all states by 1903 were characterized by some form of explicit voter suppression of Black people. All of these states were strongly Democratic in their elite composition and voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in every election from 1880, the first election following the end of Reconstruction in the South, through 1916, although nontrivial political competition from Republicans and Populists continued to exist *within* many of these states throughout the late 19th century (see Figure II). Other states sometimes labeled as Southern—including the five "border states" of Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland, and Delaware not under Confederate control during the American Civil War—occasionally opposed Democrats during this time and are less consistently grouped with the Solid South.

Besides this shared political context, lynchings of Black was also common across all eleven of the former Confederate states in the decades following the end of Reconstruction (see Figure III). As we seek to study the impact of Democratic political performance on the probability of local lynchings, and implications thereof for subsequent Democratic Party entrenchment, it is therefore natural to focus on these eleven states that have these elements in common.

Meanwhile, it is not clear *a priori* what relationship might exist, if any, between local Democratic political performance and racial violence outside of the former Confederate states. Although lynchings of Black people occurred wherever sizable Black populations were present during the period of study, local elite political interests with respect to minority empowerment

varied considerably, even among some Democrats. For instance, former border states such as Kentucky and Maryland shared many industrial interests with the Northeast, which splintered the Democratic Party along fiscal and monetary issues and bolstered Republicans. As such, Bourbon Democrats like Grover Cleveland and Alton B. Parker tended to perform well, while agrarian Democrats like William Jennings Bryan did not. This schism came to a head in the 1896 presidential election, when the Bourbon faction nominated the Kentuckian fiscal conservative and former-abolitionist John M. Palmer under the National Democratic Party label. Likewise, the Democratic Party had lost much of its influence statewide in Delaware by the 1890s. In such cases, it is not clear how lynchings might be related to local political elite interests, including those of Democrats.

Moreover, local Southern elites were in some areas strongly non-Democratic, such as in some areas of Virginia, where the "Readjusters" split off from the Democrats over fiscal issues to form a biracial coalition with Republicans; in North Carolina, where Republicans and agrarian populists formed an electoral union, which brought several hundred Black people to public office; and in Tennessee, where an Eastern "Unionist" region consistently voted Republican.

Given this historical nuance, we explore sample sensitivity along several dimensions. First, we drop each of the eleven former Confederate states one-by-one from the sample in panel (a) of Appendix Figure C.1, holding all other aspects of the specification fixed. No particular state appears to be driving our main effect. Point estimates do increase if some states, such as Virginia, North Carolina, or Tennessee are omitted from the sample, highlighting the salience of non-Democratic local elite interests in parts of those states. Beyond former Confederate sample states, effects vary by state. In Delaware, Kentucky, and West Virginia, where Democrats had reduced prominence, point estimates in equation (1) are in fact negative, of -.021, -.154, and -.082, respectively. In Maryland and Missouri, estimates are positive but less precise, of .096 and .043, respectively. With these states included in our baseline specification, our overall estimate is positive but small and noisy, of .011 (.025). Overall, this points to a less-salient Democratic elite identity in many border state areas compared to in the former Confederate states, serving to reaffirm our choice of sample states.

Choice of Sample Period. Our sample period begins with the 1880 election, which was the first following the end of Reconstruction in the South and the resultant exodus of all federal troops. Our main sample period concludes with the 1900 election, for two related reasons: (i) Jim Crow laws impeded Black voting in all former Confederate states by 1903; (ii) the Solid South was in turn arguably consolidated by the 1904 election, with little political competition within the South and Democrats thus losing few counties in the South in the elections after the 1900 election (see Figures II). As with states, our results are not sensitive to omitting any election period during this window, as shown in panel (b) of Appendix Figure C.1.

TABLE C.1. Summary Statistics

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Outcome variables					
Any Black lynchings after election τ	3,924	0.14	0.35	0	1
Any White lynchings after election τ	3,924	0.02	0.15	0	1
Democratic victory in the 1904, 1908, or 1912 elections	3,924	0.95	0.21	0	1
Voter turnout in the 1904-12 elections	3,754	34.14	16.93	3.99	82.93
# Local officeholders, 1904-12 election periods	3,924	0.40	1.22	0	12
# Democratic local officeholders, 1904-12 periods	3,924	0.10	0.40	0	4
Controls					
County longitude	3,924	-86.08	6.82	-105.13	-75.65
County latitude	3,924	34.11	2.65	25.42	39.20
Logged population density (per sqr. meter) in 1880	3,863	-11.81	1.13	-20.57	-7.77
% Black population in 1880	3,863	34.48	22.43	0	91.90
% Former slaveholders as of 1880	3,854	7.70	3.93	0	23.38
% Confederate veterans as of 1880	3,854	30.36	4.98	0	100
Any Civil War battles fought in county	3,868	0.17	0.37	0	1
Average farm size (acres per number of farms)	3,815	236.97	583.96	6	9417.50
Farm output per capita	3,825	39.33	18.24	0	143.34
Cotton potential index $\times$ price per pound	3,868	0.06	0.02	0	0.10
Tobacco potential index $\times$ price per pound	3,868	0.06	0.01	0	0.09
% Population ages 5-17	3,863	32.82	2.84	0	50
Manufacturing wages per capita	3,858	2.19	4.41	0	47.34
Manufacturing output per capita	3,858	15.18	28.47	0	456.74
Real estate property per capita	3,799	93.59	57.51	3.20	493.16
Personal property per capita	3,799	43.41	35.85	0	403.36
State taxes per capita	3,798	0.83	0.51	0.18	4.68
Local taxes per capita	3,798	0.28	0.87	0	9.27
Explanatory variables					
Democratic loss in election τ	3,924	0.27	0.44	0	1
Democratic margin of loss in election τ	3,924	-13.26	23.25	-50	49.90
Democrat-only elite at election τ	3,924	0.82	0.39	0	1
White-only elite at election τ	3,924	0.94	0.24	0	1
Newspaper variables					
Democratic newspaper	4,813	0.89	0.31	0	1
Frequency of Black crime accusations (% pages)	5,976	0.24	1.60	0	100
Frequency of Black rape accusations (% pages)	5,976	0.02	0.29	0	12.50
Frequency of Black murder accusations (% pages)	5,976	0.16	1.28	0	87.50
Frequency of Black robbert accusations (% pages)	5,976	0.06	0.85	0	50
Any election coverage in newspapers	5,976	0.12	0.33	0.00	1

Notes: Table provides summary statistics for variables based on counties in the eleven former Confederate states and election years between 1880 and 1900, restricting to a bandwidth of 50 p.p. so to focus on relatively competitive county-election observations.

FIGURE C.1. Sensitivity Tests: Excluding Individual States and Years

(A) Excluding Individual States



(B) Excluding Individual Election Years



Notes: This figure reports the RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Panel (a) excludes sample states one-by-one, where the excluded state is reported on the x-axis. Panel (b) excludes sample election periods one-by-one, where the excluded election is reported on the x-axis. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Compare estimates to column 3 in Table II (shown in solid red). Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

C.2. Variables

In this second section, we describe in detail how we code outcome and explanatory variables used in our main analysis, while also providing additional details and sensitivity exercises to further address potential concerns about these choices.

Coding the Outcome Variable. Our main outcome variable $Any\ Lynching_{c(s)\tau}$ in equation (1) indicates whether any lynchings of Black (or White) people occurred in county c of state s during the four-year electoral period following the conclusion of election τ, based on presidential elections years $\tau = \{1880, 1884, ..., 1900\}$. Given that few counties experience many lynching events, our primary outcome is defined as an indicator variable for whether a lynching event occurred during a given election period. We nevertheless define alternative outcome variables based on logged counts and rates (per 10,000 persons), which yield similar estimates to our baseline (see Appendix Table C.2).

For similar reasons, we define the outcome variable by election period rather than have it vary by year within election periods. We relax this choice in columns 3 and 6 of Appendix Table C.2, which results in highly similar relative effect sizes. Note the difference in outcome mean here relative to in Table II: whereas about 14% of county-election-year periods had Black lynching events during the sample period, only about 4% of county-*years* had them. Panel (a) of Appendix Figure C.2 furthermore estimates effects separately for each year since a presidential election. That is, column 1 considers only the 12 months after an election period, and so on. This figure shows lynchings as clearly being a response to Democratic electoral losses, with larger effects occurring in the year or two immediately after an election.

Selective Reporting of Lynchings. Historical lynching records, which comprise the raw sample upon which our analysis is based, have commonly been derived from or corroborated using historical newspaper data. Yet, despite the work of researchers, countless lynchings may still be forgotten by history. Another, related concern is of selective reporting—with some lynchings having potentially been buried *intentionally* by biased actors. Although there exists no way to directly test for this possibility, we do conduct a version of the test in Appendix Figure B.1, in which we examine the density of counties' average Democratic vote share margin across the 1880–1900 elections for the subsample of lynching-positive counties. Based on this, we fail to reject the null hypothesis ($p = .47$) that this density is continuous at the loss threshold. This is also the case ($p = .79$) if we use only county-years with a Democratic-only local elite (from Table VII). In other words, counties that were electorally competitive during the period of study, on average, exhibit similar probabilities of having recorded at least one lynching, regardless of whether Democrats tended to barely lose or barely win. It stands to reason that such places were not systematically more or less likely to have (selectively) reported on Black lynchings, at least in a way that would confound our estimates.

TABLE C.2. Alternative Outcome Measures in Table II

Dependent Variable:	Log Black Lynchings		Log Black Lynchings (per 10,000)		Any Black Lynchings	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Lost in τ	.082*	.116**	.071	.225**	.024**	.034**
	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.110)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election cycle year FE	–	–	–	–	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	17.84	21.74	19.71	19.27	16.50	20.41
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.16	0.16	0.24	0.23	0.04	0.04
Observations	1,671	2,022	1,787	1,742	6,009	7,292

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) using alternative measures of the outcome. Columns 1–2 use logged counts of lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Columns 3–4 use logged rates of lynchings (per 10,000 Black people) during the four-year election period following τ. Columns 5–6 allow for variation in the outcome by year, using indicators for whether there were any lynchings in a given county-year during the four-year election period following τ. Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Columns 5–6 also include fixed effects for observation year period year minus most recent election year. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE C.2. Dynamic Effects Within Election Periods

(A) Year-Level Post-Election Effects

(B) Year-Level Pre-Treatment Effects



Notes: Panel (a) of this figure reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, conditional upon year period since the election (e.g., column 1 uses only lynchings within a year after the election). Panel (b) reports these estimates instead based on pre-treatment Black lynchings, within each of the four year periods leading up to election τ (e.g., column 1 uses only lynchings within the year prior to the election). Estimates based on a linear running polynomial and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Coding the Treatment Variable. Our explanatory variable $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ in equation (1) captures whether the Democratic candidate for president lost the popular vote in county c in a given election year τ, where $\tau = \{1880, 1884, ..., 1900\}$. Concretely, this is coded as a 1 if the Democratic Party's candidate for president received second place at best in a given election year and as a 0 otherwise. By interacting $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ with our running

variable, defined as the Democratic loss margin $f(Loss\ Margin_{c\tau})$, we estimate treatment effects based on counties with very close election outcomes in a given election year. Vote share data for candidates used to construct these variables are from Clubb et al. (2006). For the 1896 election, in which William Jennings Bryan was nominated by multiple parties, we supplement these data with information from Robinson (1934). Treatment and running variable values are then matched to lynching events for all counties with the same identifier across both election and lynching records during a given election period. Finally, election periods τ are stacked to generate time-varying treatment and running variables. In our setting, close elections in one election period are not generally a permanent feature, so counties may enter and leave the analysis sample conditional upon the bandwidth of the analysis. For instance, only about one fifth of county-election-years experiencing a close election $|Loss\ Margin_{c\tau}| < 5$ in τ in our sample did so again in $\tau + 1$. To illustrate these dynamics, Figure IV shows the distribution of counties with $|Loss\ Margin_{c\tau}| < 5$ for the two periods of 1880–88 and 1892–1900.

Measuring Electoral Periods. We are interested in the effect of electoral outcomes on lynching activity across the subsequent four-year election period. For our primary lynching outcome variable, electoral periods consist of a four-year effect window that begins after the conclusion of the November of a given election year from 1880 through 1900. The exact choice of timing is ultimately of little consequence (see, for instance, rows 1–3 of Appendix Table C.3), which reflects the fact that few sample lynchings (i.e., less than 1%) occur during an election month (see row 7).

Of course, lack of sensitivity to exact cutoff date is natural considering the presence of some measurement error in reporting dates. Recorded lynching dates often vary somewhat across sources (e.g., different newspapers), with incorrect dates used or delays in reporting by days or weeks. For this reason, we limit to months as the most granular unit of temporal analysis.

In other cases, the act of lynching was carried out weeks after the underlying grievance was aired. In one example of the latter, Duncan McPherson, a Black North Carolina man alleged to be affiliated with a third-party group, was originally wanted by police in 1892 in connection with an Election Day "disturbance"; this led to a series of events that culminated in McPherson being lynched over a week later, on November 17.[1] In this instance, a lynching may in fact be the fulfillment of pre-election threats made with the intension of *causing* Democratic victory in that election.

Consistent with the possibility of some anticipatory effects, Appendix Table C.3 shows a gradual attenuation of estimates as we vary the start of election periods to earlier and earlier months, including to pre-election months (rows 4–6) and years (rows 8–10). Estimates fully converge to zero when *all* lynchings coded to the outcome's electoral period *precede* the electoral treatment date (row 11), as well as when they are delayed by a full election period or more

[1] As reported in "Horse and Halter," *Oxford Public Ledger*, November 25, 1892, p. 2.

(see Figure VI). Additional exercises in the paper, especially those in Table IV on unexpected electoral losses, further account for such anticipatory effects.

TABLE C.3. Additional Sensitivity and Placebos of Effect Windows in Main RD Estimates

Dependent Variable:	Any Black Lynchings (1)	Any White Lynchings (2)
	(a) Outcome Includes Lynchings During 4-Year Period After...	
1. December of Election Year τ	.102**	-.009
	(0.041)	(0.013)
2. November of Election Year τ	.104**	-.009
	(0.041)	(0.013)
3. October of Election Year τ	.083**	-.009
	(0.039)	(0.013)
4. September of Election Year τ	.082**	-.009
	(0.037)	(0.013)
5. August of Election Year τ	.078**	-.007
	(0.035)	(0.013)
6. July of Election Year τ	.066*	-.007
	(0.034)	(0.013)
	(b) Outcome Excludes Lynchings During...	
7. All Election Months	.079**	-.009
	(0.038)	(0.013)
	(c) Placebo: (Partial) Pre-Treatment Effect Windows	
8. 1 Year Before November of Year τ	.072**	-.009
	(0.035)	(0.011)
9. 2 Years Before November of Year τ	.065**	-.021*
	(0.033)	(0.011)
10. 3 Years Before November of Year τ	.051*	-.014
	(0.030)	(0.014)
11. 4 Years Before November of Year τ, w/ Lynchings Fully Pre-Treatment	.004	-.012
	(0.027)	(0.014)

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black (column 1) and White (column 2) lynchings in a given county during the four-year election period following a presidential election in November of year $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Rows vary when these electoral period windows begin, as specified in the row headers. Estimates based on linear running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

County Identifiers and Boundary Harmonization. Because we are interested in county-level electoral results, as well as lynching activity in response to those outcomes within a given county, our default data coding requires that county identifiers (i.e., FIPS code and/or name) in the Clubb et al. (2006) election records match *exactly* those in the raw lynching records from Seguin and Rigby (2019) or the Historic American Lynching (HAL) Project from Hines and Steelwater (2023). That said, this choice is largely irrelevant, with a few exceptions. First, a few counties in Texas, Arkansas, and South Carolina have missing or non-existent voting data during the sample period and therefore cannot be matched to lynching records at all. These county-year observations are by default omitted from the analysis. Second, some data cannot

be merged between, on one hand, election records (for a given election year τ) and, on the other, lynching records (for a given year t during the four-year period following τ) based on these county identifiers—for example, if there was a county split or merger that resulted in a new set of county identifiers. In such cases, one alternative option to our coding choice would be to match a lynching location to its proximate election county by manually crosswalking the latter's boundaries with the former's. However, it is not always clear in such cases that a given lynching would have been carried out in response to the election result of the *crosswalked* county, given the discrepancy in county identifier and associated boundaries, nor is it always possible to clearly crosswalk lynching locations to a single proximate election county (e.g., in the case of county mergers). Thus, a very small number of Southern lynchings during the sample period ultimately remain out of our analysis sample.

More generally, our identification strategy precludes harmonizing county boundaries to a single, common year. This is because it is essential for our RD strategy that electoral margins (and the local information they represent) reflect their true values for a given county-election period. As a result, for the purpose of defining clusters for inference, a county is assumed to become a different administrative unit if its boundaries change across election periods—even if its formal identifiers remain unchanged in the data (as is also the case with our assignment of county fixed effects in Table III). Meanwhile, we do harmonize boundaries for pre-treatment characteristics in Table I to appropriate decadal county boundaries, using the county-to-county area-based crosswalks from Ferrara et al. (2021). Our main results, in row 1 of Table III, are unaffected if we restrict the sample to the set of county identifiers with land areas that are unchanged over the sample period.

Unit of Analysis. As described in Section III.2, our core estimation is based on county-level vote shares from presidential elections. This precludes the possibility for election results to have direct impacts on local Democratic power, including local policy, which would attenuate our effects. Such is the case, for instance, for our analysis in Appendix Table C.5 below, which uses congressional elections. Indeed, if the Democratic candidate were to win in a congressional election, they might choose to use the power of the office to reduce protections against racial violence. Counties also offer a far larger sample size, characterized by more significant local competition between Democrats and other major political parties, than congressional districts. Finally, the lynching records on which we rely are primarily coded at the county level, and congressional district and county boundaries are often not congruent. Such inconsistencies further result in a loss of sample size for the congressional analysis below. For further detail on this latter concern, see our discussion of boundary harmonization above.

TABLE C.4. Conditioning on the (Populist) Opposition

Dependent Variable:	Any Black Lynchings After Election τ					
Primary Opposition:	Any		Populist		Non-Populist	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.103**	.16***	.504**	.542**	.096**	.134**
	(0.041)	(0.060)	(0.240)	(0.250)	(0.044)	(0.060)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	17.47	18.66	11.59	23.53	16.78	19.18
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.13	0.14
Observations	1,375	1,461	75	147	1,223	1,376

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given county following a given election. Columns 3–6 condition this on whether a county's highest vote-receiving non-Democrat was part of the third-party "populist coalition" (columns 3–4) or a non-populist e.g., Republican (5–6). The former is coded based on candidate affiliation with the People's Party, Greenback Party, Prohibition Party, (Union) Labor Party, Readjuster Party, or other non-Democratic and non-Republican independents. Sample is based on four-year election periods following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, excluding the 1896 election in which Democrats and the populist coalition were aligned. Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE C.5. Beyond Informational Effects: Congressional Districts

Dependent Variable:	Any Black Lynchings After Election τ					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.015	.017	.018	.046	-.120	.103
	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.150)	(0.130)	(0.220)	(0.130)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	13.31	6.78	14.39	15.52	8.81	16.76
Exclude midterm elections		Yes			Yes	
Exclude 47th Congress			Yes			Yes
Presidential election periods				Yes	Yes	Yes
Running polynomial	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear	Linear
Control outcome mean	0.42	0.40	0.46	0.57	0.65	0.58
Observations	226	70	219	262	86	252

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates corresponding to equation (1) for whether there were any Black lynchings in a given congressional district following a given election. Sample is based on two-year election periods following a national election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, except for columns 3 and 6, which exclude 1880, and columns 4–6, which use for the outcomes the four-year presidential election periods from our baseline county-level analysis. Lynchings are mapped to congressional district boundaries using the area-based crosswalks from Ferrara et al. (2021). Estimates based on linear running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in district longitude and latitude. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D. Expanding on Newspaper Analysis

This Appendix contains additional information, including examples, regarding our measure of newspaper-based anti-Black crime accusations. It also contains addition robustness exercises for our analysis in Table V.

FIGURE D.1. Examples of Newspaper Data

(A) "Negro rape"



TROOPS CALLED OUT

TO PROTECT A NEGRO RAPE FIEND IN OHIO.

Several Persons Killed and a Number of Others Wounded by the Militia in Rescuing the Prisoners from a Mob.

By Telegraph to the Morning Star.

WASHINGTON C. H., OHIO, Oct. 17.—In the Criminal Court to-day, Jasper Dolby, the negro who assaulted Mrs. Mary C. Byrd, of Parrots station, a week ago, confessed the crime and was sentenced to the penitentiary for twenty years.

(B) "Negro robbery"



man. Mr. and Mrs. Cogbill will be at home in Petersburg after November 20th.

Many complaints have recently been made to the police that during the night window slats are turned by a negro man, but with what intention cannot be said, but it is believed the negro intended robbery. Frank Williams, a bright mulatto, is under arrest and was identified by several ladies as the man who trespassed on their premises at night.

Georgie Carter, a negro woman, who keeps a boarding-house in this city, was sent to jail for four months this morning on the charge of stealing $24

(C) "Negroes murder"



A TERRIBLE CRIME IN CUBA.

Four Burly Negroes Murder, Rob and Outrage a Whole Family.

HAVANA, July 12.—A terrible crime has been committed at Guanajayabo, in the Guanajay tobacco district, about 45 miles from this city. Four burly negroes went to a grocery store at Guanajayabo and without a word of warning overpowered the grocery man and his brother-in-law and stabbed them to the heart. The negroes then rushed after the storekeeper's wife and three daughters, aged respectively 17, 6 and 4 years, with the intention of assaulting. The woman

(D) "Negroes raped"



THREE TO HANG.

The Three Negroes Who Raped Old Mrs. Cox to Swing.

The three negroes who raped old Mrs. Cox, in Big Hungry, Macon County, some months ago, the news of whose confession and sentence to death had been published in The Advertiser, will pay the penalty of their crime on the gallows to-day at 12 o'clock. Sheriff Thompson never does things by halves, and it is pretty safe to predict that there will be nothing to prevent the job being done promptly and in the most impressive style. The Advertiser will give a full account of the hanging to-morrow.

Notes: Examples of newspaper data generated by our keywords. Panel (a) shows select output for the search "negro rape," as featured in the fourth page of the *Wilmington Morning Star* on October 18, 1894. Panel (b) shows select output for the search "negro robbery," as featured in the sixth page of the *Virginia-Pilot* on November 13, 1901. Panel (c) shows select output for the search "negroes murder," as featured in the first page of the *News and Observer* on July 13, 1895. Panel (d) shows select output for the search "negroes raped," as featured in the second page of the *Montgomery Advertiser* on May 26, 1893. Clippings screencapped from newspapers.com.

TABLE D.1. Using a Fixed Bandwidth in Table V

Dependent Variable:	Frequency of Anti-Black Crime Accusations (% Pages in Newspaper)									
Newspaper Affiliation:	Any						Democratic		Non-Democratic	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Democrat Lost County in τ	.131**	.101	.152***	.152***	.075**	.105***	.147**	.229***	-.157	-.315
	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.200)	(0.270)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election cycle year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
City FE	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Newspaper FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
County spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Optimal bandwidth	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00	15.00
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Split-sample p-value							0.69	0.04	0.69	0.04
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Observations	2,620	2,620	2,620	2,620	2,620	2,620	1,824	1,824	239	239

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates for the frequency of anti-Black crime accusations in a given newspaper-year during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$, including conditional on a newspaper's partisan affiliation being Democratic (columns 7–8) or non-Democratic (columns 9–10). Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and a fixed bandwidth of 15 p.p. Anti-Black crime accusations based on accusations of rape, murder, or robbery in articles archived at newspapers.com. Data on newspaper affiliations come from Gentzkow et al. (2014a,b). The split-sample p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the difference between coefficients on $Democratic\ Loss_{c\tau}$ across subsamples is zero (e.g., between columns 7 and 9). All regressions include fixed effects for election period, election cycle year, and state (columns 1–2), city (columns 3–4, 7–10), or newspaper (columns 5–6). Columns 1–2 control for quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level, except in columns 9 and 10, which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

FIGURE D.2. Sensitivity to Excluding Individual Search Terms



Notes: This figure reports adjusted RD estimates for the frequency of anti-Black crime accusations in a given newspaper-year during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. The outcome measure excludes each one of our twelve overall search terms (e.g., "negro raped") one-by-one, where the excluded phrase is reported on the x-axis. Estimates based on a linear running polynomial and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, election cycle year fixed effects, and city fixed effects. Compare estimates to column 3 in Table V (shown in solid red). Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

TABLE D.2. Identification and Robustness Checks on RD Estimates in Table V

Dependent Variable:	Frequency of Anti-Black Crime Accusations (% Pages)	
Running Polynomial:	Linear (1)	Quadratic (2)
	(a) Alternative Standard Errors	
1. Baseline (Columns 3 and 4 of Table V)	.168***	.136**
Clustering by County	(0.042)	(0.056)
Clustering by County-Decade	(0.046)	(0.055)
Clustering by State-Election-Period	(0.049)	(0.064)
	(b) Alternative Control Sets	
2. No Controls or Fixed Effects	.081	.064
	(0.076)	(0.078)
3. No City FE w/ State FE	.126*	.139**
Quadratic Polynomial in County Longitude and Latitude	(0.073)	(0.069)
4. No City FE w/ State FE	.127*	.138**
Quadratic Polynomial in City Longitude and Latitude	(0.072)	(0.069)
5. Baseline w/ County-Pair Fixed Effects,	.152***	.131**
Matched on Proximity in Longitude and Latitude	(0.044)	(0.056)
6. Controlling for Quadratic Polynomial in	.129***	.111**
1880 Black Population Shares	(0.041)	(0.056)
7. Controlling for All Variables From Table I	.125***	.115**
	(0.041)	(0.056)
8. Baseline w/ State $\times$ Pre-Jim Crow FE	.172***	.171***
	(0.039)	(0.054)
9. Baseline w/ County Spatial Covariates $\times$ Pre-Jim Crow	.164***	.159***
	(0.044)	(0.053)
	(c) Alternative RD Specifications	
10. Optimal Bandwidth$\times 0.5$	.200***	.244***
	(0.035)	(0.039)
11. Optimal Bandwidth$\times 1.5$	.150***	.129***
	(0.050)	(0.048)
	(d) Alternative Outcomes	
12. Strict Measure:	.001	.021*
"Negro" + "Rape," "Murder", and/or "Robbery"	(0.007)	(0.011)
13. Phrase Measure:	.138***	.069
"Negro" + "Raped," "Murdered", and/or "Robbed"	(0.038)	(0.045)
14. Plural Phrase Measure:	.049***	.049***
"Negroes" + "Raped," "Murdered", and/or "Robbed"	(0.011)	(0.015)
15. Placebo Measure:	-.458	-.322
"Rape," "Murder", and/or "Robbery"	(1.17)	(1.50)
	(e) Alternative Samples	
16. Excluding Observations w/ % ¿ $\mu + \sigma$	.033**	.066***
	(0.017)	(0.020)
17. Excluding Observations w/ % ¿ $\mu + 2\sigma$	.046**	.081**
	(0.023)	(0.032)

Notes: This table reports bias-corrected local-polynomial RD estimates for the frequency of anti-Black crime accusations in a given newspaper-year during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Estimates based on linear (column 1) and quadratic (column 2) running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include fixed effects for election period, election cycle year, and newspaper city, unless otherwise specified in panel (b). Standard errors are clustered at the county level, unless otherwise specified in panel (a). See Section IV.2 for a detailed overview of the items in each row. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Elite Interest in County-level Election Results. Here, we further discuss the evidence in Section IV.2 that significant (Democratic) attention was, indeed, paid to county-level presidential election results during this period, based on patterns in media reporting. Recall that Figure VII presents the average sample intensity of newspaper reporting on county (i) losses and (ii) wins in presidential elections over the two-year periods both before and after presidential elections between 1880 and 1900, as compared to presidential election months (i.e., of November, or month 0, in every four years beginning in 1880).

These measures are based on whether an archived newspaper, as published on newspapers.com, has at least one page that printed the terms "loses county" or"lost county" (for losses), or "wins county" or "won county" (for wins), co-appearing with the words "presiden∗" and "vote∗", except for Louisiana, for which we use "parish" instead of "county."

Conditional on a positive search result, summed counts of these keyword elements are averaged across cities for inclusion in Figure VII. To do this, we build a city-month-year panel of newspapers across these six four-year electoral periods across all newspapers with at least one such positive search result. In the figure, two patterns immediately stand out. First, the intensity of coverage of county results in presidential elections peaks around elections, while also rising (somewhat less) during periods around other, non-presidential elections, when past or future presidential elections were likely to have nonetheless been invoked. Second, coverage focusing on electoral losses (i.e., framing in terms of who won a county) is far more common (dark solid, mean $= .315$ words) than coverage focusing on wins (light solid, mean $= .085$), independent of election outcomes.

Reporting on presidential election results was also common relative to reporting on other types of elections, such as congressional district (CD) elections, which we consider in Section IV.1. If we search for "presiden∗" and "vote∗" together with either "loses county," "lost county," "wins county," or "won county" (or "parish," again in the case of Louisiana) over the sample period, omitting results that also feature "congress∗", newspapers.com yields (as of May 22, 2025) 475 results, or 79 per election period. If we do the opposite, i.e., search for "congress∗" but not "presiden∗", there are 216 results, or about 18 per each (of twelve) election periods. In other words, local reporting on presidential election results exceeds reporting on CD results by a factor of about 4.4 over the sample period.

FIGURE D.3. Salience of County-level Presidential Election Results: Newspapers

(A) Lincoln County, NC (1896)



THE ELECTION IN LINCOLN.

A Close Fight in the County.—Bryan Wins on a Small Margin

The vote of Lincoln county was especially large on last Tuesday. The vote polled for the Legislature being 2,416, about 300 more than was polled two years ago. We give the vote for county legislative ticket as follows:

PRESIDENT.

Bryan 1,349
McKinley 1,010

(B) Jefferson County, AR (1900)



sas in Tuesday's election. General apathy, notwithstanding persistent warnings, made inroads, and in consequence the Democrats lost several counties. In Jefferson they failed to turn out, and for the first time in ten years the county goes Republican. Bryan received 919 votes and McKinley 1,069 so far as reported, and McKinley's majority will be about 250 in

(C) Coffee County, GA (1900)



COFFEE FOR McKINLEY.

Pearson, Ga., November 6.—(Special.)—Negroes and populists voted solidly for republicans. The outlook in Coffee county gives a small republican majority. This precinct gives McKinley's electors a majority of 4; Brantley for congress, 1.

(D) Fulton County, GA (1896)



Atlanta, Ga., Nov. 3.—Fulton county gives Bryan and Sewall a majority of 1,356, out of a total vote of 7,734. McKinley's vote was 3,189 in the county. Out of the seven city wards, McKinley carried one, the Fourth, which has a large negro population. This is the home ward of Hen-

(E) Limestone County, AL (1884)



ATHENS, ALA.

Wheeler's Majority in the County—Death of Mrs. Sallie Block.

Special to the American.

ATHENS, ALA., Nov. 6.—Gen. Wheeler, Democrat, carried this county over Day, Republican, by 61 majority. The county gives the Blaine Electors a small majority.

(F) Elizabeth City County, VA (1892)



Fired on the Negroes.

FORTRESS MONROE, November 8.—Elizabeth City and County gives Harrison, 1,293; Cleveland, 871. The Huntington Rifles were called out and fired on the crowd of colored voters. A man named Briggs was wounded in the thigh. All is quiet now.

(G) Buncombe County, NC (1896)



ASHEVILLE, Nov. 3.—The Republicans won to-day in the city and apparently in the county. The majority in Asheville for the Radical ticket is about 150 and it is figured that the same ticket will carry the county by 150 to 250. In the negro precinct, the second, the Republican majority was 319. The election

(H) Clinch County, GA (1896)



Homerville, Ga., Nov. 3.—A conservative estimate gives this, Clinch county, to Brantley for congress by 300 majority. Bryan wins by 100 majority. The official count won't change these figures materially. All the populists and dissatisfied democrats on the money question voted for McKinley.

Notes: Examples of Southern newspapers describing the county-level results of presidential elections from between 1880 and 1900. Panel (a) shows an excerpt from the *Lincoln Times-News*, printed November 5, 1896. Panel (b) shows an excerpt from the *Arkansas Democrat*, printed November 8, 1900. Panel (c) shows an excerpt from the *Atlanta Constitution*, printed November 6, 1900. Panel (d) shows an excerpt from the *Morning News*, printed November 4, 1896. Panel (e) shows an excerpt from the *Tennessean*, printed November 6, 1884. Panel (f) shows an excerpt from the *Daily Arkansas Gazette*, printed November 8, 1892. Panel (g) shows an excerpt from the *Newton Enterprise*, printed November 3, 1896. Panel (h) shows an excerpt from the *Morning News*, printed November 4, 1896. Clippings screencapped from newspapers.com.

E. Additional Results

This Appendix reports additional extensions of our many results through Sections III.3 and IV. First, Appendix Figure E.1 presents alternative versions of our main RD plots in Figure V, using (i) "zoomed-in" bandwidths of 10 p.p. and (ii) the restricted sample from panel (b) of Table II.

FIGURE E.1. Replicating Figure V with Alternative Specifications and Samples



Notes: Binned estimates of the probability of Black and White lynchings during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$ by the Democratic margin of loss in τ. Negative values on the x-axis indicate the Democratic candidate won a given county, while positive values indicate that they lost. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Panels (a) and (b) augment our preferred specifications in panel (a) of Table II (columns 3 and 7, respectively) with "zoomed-in" bandwidths of 10 p.p. to further illustrate the local behavior of the outcome variable around the RD threshold. Panels (c) and (d) adopt the restricted sample of counties that were relatively uncompetitive in the previous election $\tau - 1$ from panel (b) of Table II.

Second, we explore various additional heterogeneous effects and causal mediation analyses related to establishing our overall causal chain of close Democratic losses, anti-Black newspaper accusations, Black lynchings, and Democratic electoral reversal.

TABLE E.1. Lynchings and Anti-Black Newspaper Stories by Accusation Type

Accusation Type:	Sex		Murder		Property	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(a) Dep. Var: Any Black Lynchings After Election					
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.051*	.083**	.048	.065*	.002	.003
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	24.65	24.72	15.47	20.72	17.14	29.51
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.01
Observations	2,267	2,270	1,464	1,925	1,610	2,600
	(b) Dep. Var: Frequency of Anti-Black Crime Accusations (% Pages)					
Democrat Lost in Election τ	.028**	.052***	.035	.029	.042***	.011
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election cycle year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
City FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	11.47	12.46	12.46	14.44	14.58	23.66
Running polynomial	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic	Linear	Quadratic
Control outcome mean	0.02	0.02	0.12	0.12	0.05	0.07
Observations	2,109	2,235	2,235	2,552	2,563	3,859

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables II and V conditional on the type of criminal accusation made underlying a given lynching event (in panel a) and associated with a given newspaper story (panel b). The vast majority of accusations made are of sex- (columns 1–2), homicide- (columns 3–4), and property-related (columns 5–6) crimes. Estimates based on linear (odd columns) and quadratic (even) running polynomials and the MSE-optimal bandwidth from Calonico et al. (2014). All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E.2. Causal Mediation: Democratic Losses, Accusations, and Lynchings

Dependent Variable:	Any Lynchings of Black People in τ			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anti-Black Crime Accusations in τ	0.134*	-0.009	0.593**	0.027
(% Pages in Newspaper)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.295)	(0.399)
Causal Mediation Analysis:				
Democrat Lost County in Election τ,		0.059		0.083
Direct Effect		(0.063)		(0.063)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ,		0.020*		0.023*
Indirect Effect Through Accusations		(0.012)		(0.013)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	Probit	Probit
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	17.26	17.26	15.65	15.65
Running polynomial	–	Linear	–	Linear
Outcome mean	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Observations	520	520	520	520

Notes: This table reports estimates based on causal mediation analysis of the mediating roles of anti-Black crime accusations in newspapers during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$ in increasing the probability of a Black lynching in election period τ. Columns 1 and 3 first report county-level OLS and probit estimates, respectively, of the raw correlations between anti-Black crime accusations and the probability of a Black lynching in τ, based on MSE-optimal bandwidths derived with the mediator from Calonico et al. (2014). Column 2 and 4 then present OLS and probit estimates, respectively, of indirect effects of (close) Democratic losses through that channels, as well as direct effects, based on output from the `mediate` package in Stata. Estimates in columns 2 and 4 based on linear running polynomials. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials for county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E.3. Using Anti-Black Newspaper Accusations in Table IX

Dependent Variable:	Democrat Won County in 1904, 1908, or 1912				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anti-Black Crime Accusations in τ	0.005*	0.053*	0.029*	0.064*	0.002
(% Pages in Newspaper)	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Democrat Loss Margin in Election τ			-0.001**	-0.004***	
			(0.000)	(0.002)	
Democrat Loss Margin			0.001*	0.006	
$\times$ Anti-Black Accusations			(0.000)	(0.005)	
Causal Mediation Analysis:					
Democrat Lost County in Election τ					-0.025
Direct Effect					(0.033)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ,					0.008
Indirect Effect Through Accusations					(0.006)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	100.00	17.25	100.00	17.25	17.25
Running polynomial	–	–	Linear	Linear	Linear
Outcome mean	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Observations	1,623	520	1,623	520	520

Notes: This table reports estimates for whether there was a Democratic electoral victory in a given county in the 1904, 1908, or 1912 presidential elections on the average frequency of anti-Black crime accusations in that county's newspapers during the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Counties matched with future elections based on county identifiers. Columns 2 and 4 limit the sample based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2014) in column 3 of Table II. Columns 3 and 4 further interact the measure of newspaper accusations in τ with the Democratic Party's vote share margin of loss in the preceding presidential election. Lastly, column 5 presents estimates of indirect effects of close Democratic losses in presidential elections through the newspaper accusations channel, as well as direct effects, based on output from the `mediate` package in Stata. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E.4. Using Local Democratic Officeholders in Table IX

Dependent Variable:	Democratic Local Officeholders in 1904–12 Election Periods				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any Black Lynching in Period τ	0.007	0.046*	0.010	0.054*	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Democrat Loss Margin in Election τ			0.000	0.000	
			(0.000)	(0.001)	
Democrat Loss Margin			0.000	0.002	
$\times$ Any Black Lynching			(0.000)	(0.002)	
Causal Mediation Analysis:					
Democrat Lost County in Election τ					0.015
Direct Effect					(0.027)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ,					0.004
Indirect Effect Through Lynching					(0.004)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Local officeholders control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	100.00	15.65	100.00	15.65	15.65
Running polynomial	–	–	Linear	Linear	Linear
Outcome control mean	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.11
Observations	5,914	1,480	5,914	1,480	1,480

Notes: This table reports estimates for the number of Democratic local officeholders in a given county across the 1904–12 election periods on whether that county experienced a Black lynching event in the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Counties matched with future elections based on county identifiers. Local officeholder composition based on individuals linked to a given county and holding public office at a given time from Kestenbaum (2023). Set of offices restricted to local ones (e.g., mayoral, postmaster) in which the officeholder was in office after 1904, with a final inaugeral year of 1916. Columns 2 and 4 limit the sample based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2014) in column 3 of Table II. Columns 3 and 4 further interact the indicator for Black lynchings in τ with the Democratic Party's vote share margin of loss in the preceding presidential election. Lastly, column 5 presents estimates of indirect effects of close Democratic losses in presidential elections through the Black lynching channel, as well as direct effects, based on output from the `mediate` package in Stata. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude, as well as the total number of unique local officeholders in the county over the outcome period. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE E.5. Using Rates of Voter Turnout in Table IX

Dependent Variable:	Voter Turnout in 1904–12 Presidential Elections				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any Black Lynching in Period τ	-3.113***	-3.675***	-3.948***	-3.773***	-2.890***
	(0.371)	(0.846)	(0.584)	(0.932)	(0.990)
Democrat Loss Margin in Election τ			0.011	0.071*	
			(0.009)	(0.040)	
Democrat Loss Margin			-0.022**	-0.046	
$\times$ Any Black Lynching			(0.011)	(0.099)	
Causal Mediation Analysis:					
Democrat Lost County in Election τ					-0.053
Direct Effect					(1.10)
Democrat Lost County in Election τ,					-0.248
Indirect Effect Through Lynching					(0.190)
Election period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatial polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Optimal bandwidth	100.00	15.65	100.00	15.65	15.65
Running polynomial	–	–	Linear	Linear	Linear
Outcome control mean	32.93	36.92	32.93	36.92	36.92
Observations	5,914	1,480	5,914	1,480	1,481

Notes: This table reports estimates for the average rate of voter turnout in a given county in the 1904, 1908, and 1912 presidential elections on whether that county experienced a Black lynching event in the four-year election period following a presidential election $\tau \in \{1880, ..., 1900\}$. Counties matched with future elections based on county identifiers. Columns 2 and 4 limit the sample based on the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2014) in column 3 of Table II. Columns 3 and 4 further interact the indicator for Black lynchings in τ with the Democratic Party's vote share margin of loss in the preceding presidential election. Lastly, column 5 presents estimates of indirect effects of close Democratic losses in presidential elections through the Black lynching channel, as well as direct effects, based on output from the `mediate` package in Stata. All regressions include election period fixed effects, state fixed effects, and quadratic polynomials in county longitude and latitude. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.